What does halachah say about how to improve American health care? Not much.

Someone skeptical about halachah might ask, "Does Jewish law have anything useful to say about a public policy debate as complicated and multifactorial as health care?" Unfortunately, after reading the chapter devoted to health care in Rabbi Jill Jacobs' There Shall Be No Needy, I have to say no.

I wanted Jacobs' book to provide halachic metaphors to help me understand better what it means to support health care reform - and, ideally, to help me judge the relative ethical benefits and risks of various alternatives, even in a general way. I don't need halachah to tell me about the necessity of health care, the critical role of the health care provider, or the community's role in providing such care: these are relatively uncontroversial, things that even opponents of health care reform support. Halachah should be a source of Jewish wisdom and  something more than the deployment of righteous cliches. It should provide a particular perspective, not a reinterpretation of universalist principles which can be found in any liberal ethos.

Rabbi Jacobs' chapter is a skillful summary of the general principles of Jewish law regarding the provision of health care to the individual and community. She discusses the well-known arguments about the healer's permission to "interfere" in Divine creation when healing the sick, the need for the physician to be remunerated for their services; and the requirement inumbent on the community to provide for medical care. In an esthetic and moral sense, the passages she cites are useful - as Jacobs herself points out, they serve as a troubling reminder of the inefficiencies of the American health care system. (1)

After these summaries, however, Jacobs seems to get lost. She acknowledges that "today's system presents us with many more players than the doctor, the patient, and the immediate community" and goes out to find what halachah will tell us about these multiple factors. Unfortunately, there isn't much there (when has there been a health care system on earth as fragmented, oversized, and inefficient as ours?), so she has to limit herself to an unsatisfying historical aside on the history of Jewish hospitals and an unsurprising teshuvah by Rabbi Shlomo Goren holding that the Israeli government is required to provide health care. (2)

Jacobs acknowledges in passing that most Americans today receive health care through their employers (though she neglects to mention that veterans and Native Americans also are cared for by a national system), a state of affairs which has no halachic precedent. What then is there to say?

This is where the rubber meets the road. If there are no exact parallels in halachah to the matter at hand, perhaps there are at least useful metaphors, engaging stories, gripping ultimatums, solid philosophies. Jacobs: "From a Jewish perspective...a major problem with the American health care system is the lack of community oversight over the distribution of funds." This is disappointingly tepid and unfocused.

"Community oversight," like Mom and apple kugel, sounds good on its face. (I supported a public option and I think that a single-payer system is the way to go - I assume this is what Jacob is reaching towards with her "community oversight.") But what we need is help with a hard question: what kind of community oversight is needed, and at what level of government? Do we need more state control of apportionment of Medicare and Medicaid, or less (both could be called "community oversight")? Do we need Congressional interference in decisions about comparative effectiveness research? Should the Federal government have a role in deciding what health care should be available to which doctors? Democracy is all about the conflict of different communities, and "the Jewish perspective," at least as Jacobs is presenting it, has nothing whatever to say about these conflicting priorities.

In a concluding chapter which is useful in understanding her overall approach, Jacobs lays out her vision for how Jewish law and tradition should inform public policy (or the "public sphere," as she vaguely calls it). Unfortunately, this vision is not convincing.

Why unconvincing? Her "essential principles" ("the dignity of human life," "the inherent disparity of power" between different classes, and the reciprocal responsibilities of individual and community) are not unique to Judaism. This would not be a problem if halachah provided a unique perspective on issues of public policy - but I don't see any evidence of that here either. How, according to Jacobs, should Jewish law inform our discussions? "Jewish sources should help us to see various sides of an issue,challenge our assumptions, and enable us to formulate a response that takes multiple factors into account." Again, this is nothing we need halachah for - only a liberal cast of mind and general civic virtues of tolerance and open inquiry. (3)

It is not inspiring to say that halachah offers us no guide in some areas of life, but I think that's the case. I will not ask a posek the next time I prescribe an antibiotic and I don't think I need one either when considering various aspects of health care reform. (4) General moral guidelines about the importance of health care are available in halachah, should one choose to seek them there (though they can be found nearly everywhere else in a liberal society). For practical approaches to systematic reform, we should look elsewhere.

Update: See Rabbi Josh Yuter's shiur on the topic here, which I haven't listened to all of yet.

1. Jacobs says that our country's systematic inefficiencies and profit-driven nature "prevents many patients from being able to afford needed medical care." This is undoubtedly true, but another issue - which Jacobs does not explicitly address - is that Americans want too much medical care: too many labs, tests, and procedures, which drive up costs without improving care. This, among many other complications of the health care system, is something which our halachic predecessors simply could not envision, although I am sure one could, by stretching some precedent to the breaking point, find a proof text of use.


2.  Jacobs calls this teshuvah influential, but I suspect she is mixing up the chicken and the egg. Surely more determinative in today's halachic world is the fact that Israel is a democracy. Democracies legislate and administer national health care. Were Israel not a democracy, or not able to administer health care, the Goren teshuvah would be forgotten.


3. In fact, one could argue that Jewish law - in many places - does not place a premium on tolerance or open inquiry. There is the apikores and the min, after all.


4. In this regard, Rabbi Jacobs' philosophy bears a surprising (and disquieting) resemblance to Charedi daas Torah: that rabbis have a variety of expertise which equips them to offer advice even in practical situations far afield from their formal erudition. 

Future reasons for interrogation by the crack Western Wall egal-women arrest team

1. Tzitzit while ovarian.
2. Female etrogging.
3. Giving tzedakah while under the influence of X chromosomes.
4. Studying Torah . . . while female!
5. The tallit was too cute.
6. Singing. Singing is just bad. All singers should be arrested a priori.
7. Mitzvot are disruptive in general to the status quo. All the more so when done by women.
8. Arrest them all! Let Ovadiah Yosef sort them out.

Nofrat Frenkel in and out of the spotlight

I appreciate the piece by Nofrat Frenkel in the Forward, but it is hard to square with what was said in her name on a Conservative e-mail list I subscribe to:

Sat, Nov 21, 2009 at 10:47 AM
[Shefa] Women of the Wall (WoW)

On Shabbat I spoke with Nofrat Frenkel and she asked to clarify:

1) She was not arrested. She was detained for questioning.

2) She did nothing that is not regularly done at WoW service. She has no idea what caused the police to suddenly intervene.

3) She would like the issue to drop out of the spotlight, so the police close the case without a trial and her (future) license to practice medicine is not jeopardized.

A good week to all,

I suppose it wouldn't be the first time that someone in the spotlight, for reasons not of her own choosing, is unsure whether she wants to be there.

What does a Conservative commentary on the Shulchan Aruch need to have?

1. An introduction placing the SA in context within the general halachic philosophy of the C movement, answering (or at least approaching) such questions as these: is the SA normative? some of the time, maybe? or all of the time? (It can't be normative all of the time, because no law code is normative all of the time. Customs, other halachot, and the march of history supplant numerous rulings in the SA.) If it's not normative, what is it?

2. A general answer to the question, "what do we do when the halachah is immoral" (e.g., when we are told that cheating non-Jews in financial dealings is okay so long as they don't know about it; or when it is assumed that women are not intellectually fit to learn Torah or participate in community life)

3, I am a cultural nationalist, so I think any such commentary (okay, I'll bite: maybe the one I'll try to write) needs to be in Hebrew. Or Yiddish. But English is fine...just so it is an English thick with references and cultural suppositions of the halachic/midrashic/Jewish religious literature. But *at the same time* whoever comments needs to be able to make reference to the social and natural sciences without being apologetic or succumbing to special pleading.

Anyone for rising up in the morning in the lion to do the Divine will....Convo-style?

Where is the Conservative Shulchan Aruch?

I was talking with a friend about all manner of things (mostly his research, which I do like to hear about). We got onto the topic of the Chofets Chayim, and I mentioned that whenever I learn the Shulchan Aruch, it's as if the Chofets Chayim is commenting on another work entirely, so different his world view seems from that of the Mechaber and the Rema.

So I thought: where is the Conservative commentary on the Shulchan Aruch? Shouldn't there be a maestro halachist somewhere in JTS (or UJ, or Schechter) that can bestride the centuries, bringing Caro's mystical magid into our studies?

Failing that, maybe the lay public can try, in the spirit of open source Judaism. An act of massive chutzpah? Sure. But what of worth was constructed without it?

Galgal ha-machzor

The Rabbinical Assembly continues to be liturgenic.

Before Yom Kippur I got a look at a PDF (uncorrected, not for distribution, highly radioactive, not proofread, and under the strictness of Conservative cherems. Also available here) of the new RA High Holiday machzor, scheduled for publication in May, 2010.

Readers of this blog (hi, Dad) might know that I have bitched and moaned in the past about the Conservative machzor, vintage 1978, with its worst translation in the world and assorted theological missteps (confessing our sins against the victims of the Holocaust!).

Features of the new machzor, or at least what I saw of it, that I like:

• Retaining (or reviving) the double-acrostic al-chet.
• Revising and in many cases improving the English translations.
• Including piyyutim (liturgical poetry) from a variety of locales and centuries, including some not familiar to me (your machzorage may vary).
• A marginal commentary that is helpful but not in your face. It's not as scholarly (read: nerdy) as I would like, but I'm not sure that was their goal.
• A great acrostic alternative to Avinu Malkenu.

Features I could do without:

• Tortured & corny rationalizations for including the imahot in the Amidah. If you include them (I do), then do it, and include the option in the machzor. But vague yeasty talk about "listening to women's voices" won't move anyone anywhere but away from inclusion.
• Keeping the silly English acrostic as a translation for the al-chet. It's still silly.

I'm looking forward to seeing the final version.

Bless the sun?

This seems a wonderful & fertile example of aggadic creativity, but I wonder how I am supposed to react to the bracha when (a) I don't think it makes sense to speak of the sun returning to the same place in the heavens, given that the heavens have changed considerably since creation; and (b) we can't date creation to any particular date, and certainly not the zero-date postulated by Chazal. So do I:
1. Quash doubts nusach ha-ortodoksyah?
2. View it as a pretty metaphor albeit astronomically impossible?
3. Give up astronomy, especially belief in a universe billions of years old?
4. Or maybe just omit shem ve-malchut?

Grass-roots beef

Not surprising: the organizational impetus and scholarship behind the growing concern with Rubashkin's - this comes from the Conservative movement's rabbis. But the grass-roots activism comes from the Orthodox (albeit the most liberal).

Making a Minyan: Women in Tefillin
Famous picture - second thoughts.

As I looked at the picture over and over again, I felt used. I didn't see myself in it, nor my mother, nor the other women I knew. Instead I saw the photographer's projection of what women in tefillin must be like: angry.
[. . .] We looked, to me, like a caricature of angry, scowling feminists. I called it the "Scary Amazon Women in Tefillin picture." [. . .]

For me, davening in tallit and tefillin has never been about women demanding the right to engage in rituals that had been limited to men. To me, the tallit and tefillin are how Jews should pray, and I had never, until I saw myself in that picture, seen them as an act of feminist defiance. [. . .]

But over time, something unforeseen began to happen. I started to get angry. I saw the female professors I admired in college not get tenure while their male counterparts were promoted. I saw the Jewish community blame highly educated working women for a declining birth rate. I saw women who had entered the Conservative rabbinate struggle for acceptance and for equality even 20 years after that historic decision. I saw my friends have babies and struggle to afford child care. [. . .]

I don't think [the photographer] was somehow prescient in his portrayal of us. I certainly don't think that he was predicting my own personal disillusionment. While I still think that his photo doesn't capture the essential love of Judaism, of prayer, of God, of ritual -- whatever it was that had brought each of the ten very different women in his picture to take on the mitzvot of tallit and tefillin, I now recognize myself in that minyan of defiant women, and that is a terrible disappointment.

Rahel Lerner in Lilith, Fall 2007. The piece (not on-line) is well worth reading in its entirety, as is the companion essay by her mother in response to the same picture.

Sukkah poster with Conservative gedolim

Is there one? Can somebody make one?

Loneliness/Holiness
Resting on the eighth day.

I like our Diaspora's Shemini Atzeret, this shy orphan yontev. Rarely is it jovially nicknamed ("what are you doing for the Shmi?"). Its songs are stolen from contiguous holidays. Some people make a point on that day of sitting in the sukkah - because it's still Sukkot. Some make a point of not sitting in the sukkah - lest it get mixed up with Sukkot, because it's a holiday of its own. The uncertainty is charmingly Atzeretsian.

Come out from your cave, Shmi! We love you.

* * *

Even more interesting than the ongoing saga of How Dead Is Conservative Judaism (I guess it's hard to find a less interesting topic) is the tale of Arnie Eisen. This professor of sociology is now the de facto spiritual leader of the Conservative movement, meant to be the miracle worker of 3080 Broadway. This cries out for a superhero, The Sociologist-Rebbe (busy, Mike?):

Disciple: Oy, rebbe! Is this chicken kosher?

Eisen: Yankl, I find it fascinating that you are voluntarily submitting to my authority!

Gay? Okay!
Apparently uncontroversially. And uninterestingly.

I love my shul but sometimes it drives me up the wall.

For instance, a recent letter (signed by the Chair, the President, and the rabbi) informs us of some recent deliberations of our Ritual Committee, which discussed "how [the recent] decisions of the CJLS [regarding homosexuality] would affect our membership criteria; and second [. . .] whether or not we would recognize and celebrate gay and lesbian relationships." The conclusions, unsurprisingly, are that "two adult Jews who are members of the same household may enjoy a joint membership" and that "we should publicly acknowledge same sex relationships in the ways we currently acknowledge married couples. This change would mean that a gay or lesbian couple could hold a commitment ceremony in our synagogue and be called to the Torah together in celebration of an anniversary." It is also unsurprising that "both recommendations were overwhelmingly endorsed" by the shul's governing bodies.

I agree with all this! This is all good, for reasons I think I've outlined before on this blog and which scholars have defended in the relevant teshuvot: in short, homosexuality is not immoral, halachah and morality should reinforce each other despite significant but temporary contradictions; and, just as the prohibitions in the Torah have been continually re-understood throughout the generations, our generation is bound to do the same. What drives me nuts is that none of these plausible reasons - no reasons at all! - are stated in the letter. Sure, our rabbi spoke about these issues from the pulpit, but now, when actual decisions bearing on peoples' lives have been made in our shul, would be the perfect time for a full-throated (re)statement of the principles our shul finds applicable in this situation - or, at the very least, why these recommendations were "overwhelmingly endorsed." What is it about gay and lesbian commitment which put it onto our shul's agenda? Do we think not recognizing such unions is a moral wrong? Then say it! Put some bite into the "overwhelming endorsement"!

I wonder if the way this decision might have been made in our own shul (I don't really know how it was made, since I wasn't at the meetings; I'm just speculating) might reflect how it might be made in the Conservative movement at large. There are two possibilities that come to mind. One is that the majority of Conservative Jews (who care about such matters at all) have already made their own intuitive halachic decision. Puk chazei: go and see what the people are doing, and what they are doing is failing to endorse the putative immorality of homosexuality or the eternal validity of toevahschaft. Second is that people don't really care; this halachah is something which was ignored, or taken for granted to be invalid in any case.

I much prefer the first option. In that case, I would welcome (again) an endorsement by our shul's leadership, that this change was taken for positive, halachic-affirming reasons and not merely as a drift down the stream of inertia.

Eschatology ho!
Elul concentrates the mind wonderfully.

I have been reading the ninth chapter of Maimonides' Laws of Repentance, with its differentiations among the various final chapters of our worldly existence. Maybe because the world at times feels well-nigh unraveled, there's not just one end of days but multiple: the world to come (where the righteous sit, crowned by the Divine radiance), which is not the same as the Messianic age. Per Maimonides (quoting the Talmud), the Messianic age is different from the present age in one particular only: the Jews' sovereignty over the Land of Israel.

"But we're there!" you might say. Not so fast. If you are in the mood to quibble, you might say that (a) the current State of Israel is not coextensive with the Land of Israel, and/or (b) the current sovereignty is not the same as the Kingdom to which the traditional sources refer.

But I don't quibble - not because I think the current political situation in Israel can be identified with malkhus ("sovereignty"), but because I don't think that malkhus is the criterion for the messianic age. Even if there weren't multiple opinions in the Talmud about what the messianic entails, I still wouldn't think such sovereignty is important enough to serve as the hook to hang the Messiah's hat on.

Certainly sovereignty is important (I'm enough of a Zionist to say that), but we need something else to convert the world-that-is into the world-that-ought-to-be, something basic and transformative. It doesn't seem like the return of Jews to our historical homeland, as positive and uplifting (and basic) an endeavor as this is, quite fits the bill.

How then will the messianic age differ from our own? (Providing one believes in such an age.) I don't have any neat answers.; anything neat enough to propose here would be flat and unsatisfying. But I agree with a friend of mine, Richard Claman at Town and Village Synagogue, who has said more than once in his lectures that Conservative Jews have been afraid of discussing eschatology - the end of the days. We have left that stuff to the fundamentalists, at our own peril.

The point he makes is this: when we teach our children about Judaism, we brainwash them. Clearly we think that the benefit of this brainwashing outweighs the downside of coercion. What is the benefit? Do we think that our Judaism will bring redemption to the world? a dawn of peace? does the Jewish people have a unique role to play, and if so, what? What is the malkhus which our Messianic age will bring?

Justice, justice, shalt thou eat

A blog about the "social justice hechsher." (Hat tip to S.B. of Louisville.)

My favorite gay-and-lesbian teshuvah

It took me this long to read Rabbi Gordon Tucker's teshuvah? It's as if all the questions and problems I have been having, all the points I have been fumbling after (and wasting precious bandwidth on, inelegantly and ineloquently, in this blog) have been encapsulated and justified. Go read. Let's talk. Dov W., are you out there? Come challenge.

And you shall bind them (2)

A few days ago I talked about Rabbi Michael Broyde's prediction of the Conservative movement's imminent demise. What interested me were two throwaway statements: (1) "halachah is binding" (implying that this statement is unquestionably true for everyone, in the same way, at all times), and (2) American Jews can be divided into those who believe (1) is true and those who don't.

Comes a recent post by Jonathan Woocher on the Conservative e-mail list Shefa which nicely addresses point 2. So I'll quote it here in its entirety. Two points: although Broyde was trying to classify the whole of the Jewish community, Woocher talks here about the difficulty of defining the Conservative movement. I think the same difficulties apply to either, which is why I'm citing this. Second, the poster thinks it would be problematic for the Conservative movement to define itself based on behavioral criteria. I agree with this, probably for same reason as the poster. Indeed, it would be curious if behavioral criteria were not part of the C. movement's self-definition (such criteria being an essential part of halachah) - but only a part, since if it were the whole definition we would be a movement dedicated to self-policing and ruling people out rather than in.

I believe that part of the difficulty in addressing questions of denominational identity, boundaries, etc., is that there are multiple dimensions of what we might mean by, say, “the Conservative movement.” We might be talking about the movement’s 1) ideology (and, of course, none of the movements has a single, coherent ideology, but rather at best a set of ideologies with certain common elements); 2) program (different than an ideology; this is what it actually focuses its collective energies on at any given point in time); 3) institutions (synagogues, seminaries, USCJ, RA, etc.); 4) people (not just the public figures, but the people one encounters or encountered in the past in shul, school, camp, etc.; and/or 5) style (as with ideologies, movements do have multiple styles, but the “styles” of Conservative and Reform Judaism are generally fairly distinct). My observation is that what attracts individuals to a particular movement may be any of these (singly or in combination). So, one may well be ideologically “Reform,” but have a social network largely made up of Conservative Jews and prefer a service with more Hebrew.

There is a natural and understandable inclination to believe that ideology should be the trump card in this deck. This would lead to saying, e.g., that if you don’t believe in the normative authority of Halakha (leaving aside for the moment what we understand Halakha and its normative authority to be), you really don’t belong in the Conservative movement. However, it’s not clear to me that we should privilege ideology in this fashion, especially since it is an arena in which multiple positions coexist. So, unless one is prepared to set either strict ideological boundaries (how would we enforce these?) or – even more problematic – behavioral boundaries (which is where this thread began: questioning whether those who do not follow “normative Conservative practice,” e.g., not eating non-Kosher food outside the home, should have their opinions counted on an issue like gay ordination), I’m afraid we are stuck with an ambiguous movement in an ambiguous world.

I, for one, am comfortable with this, since the alternative would in my view be far worse, namely a movement constantly checking its tzitzes. I would not find this a very appealing landscape on which to take my Jewish journey.

And you shall bind them

Rabbi Michael Broyde wrote in the Jewish Week that Conservative Judaism is dying. Sad, don't you know, to see pure Jewish souls lost to the likes of Ramah and JTS. And it's all because we embraced the homosexuals and uprooted a clear "Sinaitic prohibition". (If, on the other hand, we had created a "Sinaitic prohibition" where none existed before, that would be okay. But I digress.)

Now, the bulk of the article is founded on the same mistaken premise beloved by Orthodox demagogues everywhere: that "Jewish law" is by definition what Orthodox rabbis say is Jewish law. Thus Conservatism does not follow Jewish law because (wait for it) Conservative Judaism is not Orthodox.

The author, I remind you, is a professor of law at Emory.

But even apart from this intellectual heavy lifting he does say something interesting:

The truth is that there is a grand divide in the Jewish community worldwide between two groups: those who think that Jewish law (halacha) is really, truly, binding and those who do not.

There are two implied propositions here:
1. Jewish law is binding.
2. Jews can be divided into two groups: those who think 1. is true and those who think 1. is not true.

What does it mean for halachah to be "binding"?

With "binding" in English we generally refer to a legal decision or agreement which the party or parties have agreed to follow beforehand, as in the phrases "binding contract" or "binding arbitration." An individual or body issues a decision on a contested point of law or procedure; the party must act according to that decision on pain of negative consequences.

Halachah is different. In some cases, a person presents a question to a rabbi on a certain matter, the rabbi renders a decision, and the person then acts according to that decision. This happens in a minority of occasions, even in Orthodox communities - thus I don't think that this what Rabbi Broyde is referring to in his characterization of halachah as binding. Rather, he is more plausibly referring to the body of halachah as binding.

Leave aside for a moment how we should define the body of halachah, because this is where R. Broyde and his Conservative colleagues differ. The problem is, for understanding "bindingness," that the situation of the Jew following halachah is different from the legal subject obeying a legal decision. For one thing, the source is not clear. Theologically speaking, the Source is clear, but halachah is many-layered, many-authored, and oftentimes internally contradictory. Thus, unless one asks a particular rabbi for a particular decision at that particular second, there are many particular elements of "Jewish law" one could hew to, or not. Even a given halachic question can be differently framed depending on how the "body of halachah" is understood.

The above is not to say that Jewish law is not binding. Of course I think it is! Merely that it is not enough, true, or convincing to say that "Jewish law is binding" means "I look in the Shulchan Aruch and I do what it says." The fact that I can disagree with one halachic source and agree with another makes any such characterization difficult.

In fact, given that halachah is so multi-faceted and non-unitary, it is no wonder that minds much greater than I have defined the bindingness of halachah as contingent on the existence of a community which sees halachah as binding! Thus we're right back to where we started, unless R. Broyde is of the opinion that "halachah is binding" means "Orthodox Jewish practice is binding."

Why all this throwing words around? Because if we are to divide American Jews into groups based on who thinks Jewish law is binding, it would help to get a handle on what this proposition actually means. Let's imagine we've done that (though we haven't), and return later to the issue of what American Jews think - even more complicated than the definition of "binding"!

Mass solemnization
Or: liturgy on deadline.

It turned out that this Shabbos (when I wasn't working) happened to be the day when our shul's rabbi talked about gays, lesbians, and marrying 'em off to each other. Being a rabbi, and a sober, thoughtful one at that, he said (I'm paraphrasing): "I'll think about it and let you know." No surprise there.

The decision for our shul about whether to solemnize (celebrate, kiddush-ify, etc.) gay and lesbian partnerships is not really up in the air; I'd be surprised if the rabbi's decision does not make use of the CJLS teshuvot allowing them. But one main thing, now that the decision has more or less already been made, is that these ceremonies be not lame.

By "not lame" I actually mean a somewhat higher standard: liturgically powerful. With traditional oomph. Let the first GL couple come up to our bimah and get married in the context of psukim thoughtfully and poetically framed. I want liturgical creativity but in a formalist vein. Let us not have fifty different versions of self-written vows, nor de-heterosexualized versions of kiddushin -- since homosexual marriages are bound to be something else. Why not a legal formula that challenges and surprises, as does the harei at every time I hear it said? Why not re-write the ketubah from scratch? Who says a glass has to be broken?

Super Jewish Historical Prediction Game
Anybody can play. And everybody wins!

I. circa 1980

Cathy Conservative: Women should read from the Torah!
Joe Modern Orthodox: Pshaw!

c. 1995

Joe M.O.: Look, everybody! Women can read from the Torah!

II. 2006

Cathy Conservative: Monogamous gay and lesbian relationships are kosher!
Joe M.O.: Pshaw!

c. 2025

Joe M.O.: __________ (you fill in the blank)

Gay gezunt
A brief note about Rabbi Roth.

The decision of the Conservative movement's Committee on Jewish Law and Standards to approve three separate teshuvot with regard to homosexuality will satisfy no one completely. This baffles the extremists, who believe that no one should be satisfied at all. (For isn't the point of halachah an iron-bound maximalism?)

I wish Rabbi Roth weren't resigning from the Committee; I'm guessing this means that he will choose to no longer be affiliated with the movement. He is a towering scholar of unparalleled erudition. Perhaps though this a fitting moment to remind ourselves of two recent statements of Rabbi Roth's (made here):

I urge halakhically committed gay Jews not to reject the possibility that the severity of the halakhic demand of celibacy might be somewhat or significantly mitigated by some modes of therapy and treatment. Since the halakhic prohibition stands irrespective of whether there is treatment possible or not, there is little to be lost in giving a chance to treatment for which claims of marked success are made and attested.

As I mentioned before, the fact that Rabbi Roth believes such "attested" claims of "marked success" in the mitigation of homosexual behavior speaks more to his biases and unintentional ignorance than to any intellectual failing. More important however is his following claim:

. . . an inability to legitimate homosexuality halakhically makes no negative claim whatsoever about the humanity, sanctity, worth, and dignity of homosexuals.

The fact that Rabbi Roth sees no difficulty with this claim (or, at least, no necessity to defend it properly) casts light on a sharp disconnect between halachic strict constructivism and halachic compassion. (Note that this sentence itself makes no distinction between homosexual behavior and homosexuals themselves, a difference which Rabbi Roth dwells upon at length elsewhere.)

Update: A JTS source writes us.

Rabbis Roth and Rabinowitz left for different reasons. in Rabinowitz's case he believes there is not much point to the CJLS. Any rabbi can write a teshuvah and publish it on the web and any other rabbi can either follow that p'sak or not. Rabbi Roth left to make a point that "decisions have consequences". He thought the Dorff Nevins Reiser teshuvah was clearly a case of poskim considering an issue with a predetermined answer in mind. He sees nothing wrong with being predisposed to a certain answer as in the case with deciding someone is not a mamzer or not an agunah, but he says even then if the case is clear there is nothing to do. In his mind this a case where the answer was clear the other way. In particular he said the decision rested on three pillars--all of which would have to hold--and all of which are "tenuous at best". In particular he thought they made way too much out of an apparent makhlokhet between Rambam and Ramban about whether "everything else" is d'rabbanan. He said almost every rabbi since has said that Ramban simply misunderstood Rambam and thought Rambam was saying innocent touching was prohibited d'oraita. [I wish I could find a copy of Roth's teshuvah to better understand these arguments]. Roth also thought the principle of k'vod habrit was with only a few excpetions used for person X to violate a prohibition for the sake of person Y, and even when that was not the case it was always a social situation whereas private bedroom behavior was not a social situation.

Roth was asked how this decision was any worse than the driving teshuvah--and he served on the committee after that. Roth responded that he was a kid when the driving teshuvah came out. That this decision was not worse, but rather on par with the driving teshuvah and that he served on the committee to try to prevent anything like that from happening again, which it did. He notes that both the authors of the homosexuality teshuvah and the driving teshuvah had pure intentions, but were irresponsible. Roth said he will continue to pasken if asked his opinion on an issue. He also noted that many people asked him to reconsider his decision so he is doing that--reconsidering. He has not made any decisions yet about returning to the CJLS. Once again though it sounds clear that the resignation was solely from the CJLS and Roth does not seem to have any intention of leaving either JTS or the movement.